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Abstract
Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the
Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security
of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange
method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR’s scheme is unphysical and that
some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a
technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics.
For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and
statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To
show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive
attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that
employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical
analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to
the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude
that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.
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Introduction
Information theoretic (i.e., unconditional) security [1] means
that the stated security level—either perfect or imperfect, as in any
physical system [2]—holds even for cases when the abilities of an
eavesdropper (generally called ‘‘Eve’’) are limited only by the laws
of physics. Since 1984, quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] has
been claimed to possess unconditional security and much later, in
2005, an alternative based on classical physics, known as the
Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme [2], appeared as a
competing approach.
Very recently, QKD’s co-founder Charles Bennett [3] co-
authored a manuscript [4] with Jess Riedel wherein they present
an extensive criticism of the KLJN scheme and deny its security
under idealized conditions. Bennett and Riedel (BR) assert that
thermodynamics is not essential in the KLJN scheme and argue
that it does not provide security. They attempt to prove this claim
by showing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method
with nothing but two batteries and two switches. Moreover,
among other statements [4], BR argue that the quasi-stationary
(i.e., no-wave) limit of electrodynamics is unsuited for information
transfer, thus implying that this (required) assumption [2] for
(perfect) security of the KLJN system is unphysical. Our present
paper is a detailed critical analysis of the BR scheme. In summary,
we show that BR’s scheme is unphysical, and we provide further
analysis that demonstrates the security of the KJNL scheme.
In this introductory chapter we set the scene for the next
chapter, wherein we will fully crack the BR system in various ways
and also respond to BR’s arguments about the KLJN scheme. We
first consider the currently ongoing debates concerning the
security of QKD, which is a necessary preamble since BR
propound that the security of QKD is robust. Then we briefly
outline the KLJN secure key distribution scheme and its main
features. Subsequently, we describe the ‘‘thermodynamics-free’’
key exchange system due to BR and the related argumentation in
their paper [4].
1.1 Is the security of quantum encryption indeed robust?
BR write [4]: ‘‘we emphasize that quantum key distribution has been
shown to be robust with imperfect components against very general attacks’’.
We see this situation very differently and first briefly summarize
the currently ongoing debates in the QKD field.
Currently, there is a discussion [5–8] about the fundamental
security/non-security of existing QKD schemes. This debate was
initiated by Yuen [5,8], who was later joined by Hirota [6] in
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claiming that the security of existing quantum key distribution
schemes is questionable or poor. Recently, Renner [7] entered the
discussion to defend the old security claims. It should be noted that
Yuen [9] and Zubairy et al. [10] have proposed new advanced
schemes for non-QKD-based secure quantum communication.
BR’s claim that QKD displays ‘‘robust security with imperfect
elements’’ [4] has been proven incorrect, and QKD has been
cracked by utilizing the imperfect nature, such as non-linearity, of
necessary building elements. Practical quantum communicators—
including several commercial ones—have been fully cracked as
shown in numerous recent papers [11–25]. Vadim Makarov, who
is one of the leading quantum crypto crackers, stated that ‘‘Our hack
gave 100% knowledge of the key, with zero disturbance to the system’’ [11].
This statement hits the foundations of quantum encryption
schemes, because the often-claimed basis of the security of QKD
protocols is the assumption that any eavesdropping activity will
disturb the system enough to be detected by the communicating
parties (generally referred to as ‘‘Alice’’ and ‘‘Bob’’). An important
aspect of these quantum-based hacking attacks is the extraordinary
(100%) success ratio of extracting the ‘‘secure’’ key bits by Eve,
which indicates that the security is not only imperfect but simply
non-existing against these types of attacks until proper defense
strategies or protocol modifications have been added to the
scheme in order to restore the information theoretic security they
supposedly had before these attacks were known.
In conclusion, and in clear contradiction to BR’s claim [4],
quantum key distribution has been found vulnerable to well-designed attacks
for the case of imperfect components.
1.2 The KLJN secure key exchange system
The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise key distribution scheme
[2,26–39] is a classical statistical physical alternative to QKD,
whose security is based on Kirchhoff ’s Loop Law and the
Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. More generally, it is founded on
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which certifies that the
security of the ideal KLJN scheme is as strong as the impossibility
to build a perpetual-motion machine of the second kind. Potential
and unique technical applications of the KLJN scheme include
non-counterfeitable hardware keys and credit cards via Physical
Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) [35]; unconditionally secure
hardware, computers and other instruments [35,36]; and uncon-
ditionally secure smart grids [37–39]. The short summary of the
KLJN scheme given below is based on a previous survey paper [2].
1.2.1 The idealized KLJN scheme and its security. The
working principle of the KLJN scheme [2,26] is presented in Fig. 1,
which shows an idealized configuration without any defense
circuitry—such as current-voltage measurement/comparison,
filters, etc—against invasive and non-ideality attacks. At the
beginning of each bit exchange period (BEP), Alice and Bob
connect their randomly chosen resistors RA and RB, respectively,
to the wire line. These resistors are randomly selected by the
switches from the set RL,RHf g, RL=RHð Þ, where the elements
represent the low L and high H bit values 0 and 1, respectively.
The Gaussian voltage noise generators—delivering white noise
with publicly agreed bandwidth—represent an enhanced thermal
( Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed high effective noise-
temperature Teff at which their noises are statistically independent
from each other, implying that SUA(t)UB(t)T~0, as well as from
the noise during a former BEP. During the first practical
implementation of the KLJN scheme, by Mingesz et al. [29], the
noise-temperature range 8|108KƒTeffƒ8|1011K was used,
which made the wire temperature insignificant even when the wire
resistance was not zero.
Alice and Bob (as well as Eve) can use a measurement of the
mean-square voltage and/or current to assess the bit status of the
system, as shown in Fig. 2 for the case of voltage. The situations
LH and HL represent secure bit exchange [2,26], because Eve
cannot distinguish between them through measurements, and
whenever Alice and Bob see the HH/LH situation they know that
the other party has the complementary bit value, which means
that they infer the full bit arrangement. Eve cannot extract this
information, because she does not know any of the bit values. In
other words, a secure bit has been generated and shared. The bit
situations LL and HH are insecure, which means that these bits
(50% of the executed BEPs) are discarded by Alice and Bob.
According to the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem, the power
density spectra Su,L( f ) and Su,H ( f ) of the voltages UL,A(t) and
UL,B(t), supplied by the voltage generators in RL and RH , are
given by
Su,L( f )~4kTeff RL and Su,H ( f )~4kTeff RH , ð1Þ
respectively. In the case of secure bit exchange (i.e., the LH or HL
situation), the power density spectrum S( f ) and the mean-square
amplitude SU2chT of the channel voltage Uch(t), and the same
measures of the channel current Ich(t), are given by
SU2c,HL=LHT~Df Su,c,HL=LH fð Þ~4kTeff
RLRH
RLzRH
Df , ð2Þ
and
SI2c,HL=LHT~Df Si,c,HL=LH tð Þ~
4kTeff
RLzRH
Df , ð3Þ
respectively, where Df is the noise bandwidth.
1.2.2 The security of the KLJN scheme is based on the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. During the LH and HL
cases, linear superposition makes the spectrum given by Eq. (2)
represent the sum of the spectra at the two particular situations.
Thus one obtains
SL,u,c( f )~4kTeff RL
RH
RLzRH
 2
ð4Þ
when only the noise generator due to RL is running and
SH,u,c( f )~4kTeff RH
RL
RLzRH
 2
ð5Þ
when the only the noise generator due to RH is running.
If Eve is to identify which end of the wire has RL or RH , it is
necessary for her to measure and evaluate a physical quantity
offering directional information. In the ideal case, the only
information of this kind is the direction of the power flow from
Alice to Bob (or vice versa, depending on the choice of positive
current direction). In thermal equilibrium, however, this power
must fulfill PA?B~SUc(t) Ic(t)T~0, as required by the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. In other words, the ultimate security of
the KLJN system against passive attacks is provided by the fact
that the power PH?L, by which the noise generator due to resistor
RH is heating resistor RL, is equal to the power PL?H by which
the noise generator due to resistor RL is heating resistor RH
[2,26,32]. Thus the fact that the net power flow is governed by
PA?B~PL?H{PH?L~0 can easily be shown from Eqs. (4) and
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(5) for the noise-bandwidth Df by
PL?H~
SL,u,c(f )
RH
~4kTeff
RLRH
RLzRHð Þ2
Df ð6aÞ
and
PH?L~
SH,u,c(f )
RL
~4kTeff
RLRH
RLzRHð Þ2
Df ð6bÞ
The equality PH?L~PL?H is in accordance with the Second Law
of Thermodynamics. In other words it is as difficult to crack the
ideal KLJN scheme as to build a perpetual motion machine of the
second kind [4].
This security proof against passive (listening) attacks holds only
for Gaussian noise—i.e., the statistics of thermal noise—which has
the well-known property that its power density spectrum or
autocorrelation function already provides the maximum achiev-
able information about the noise, and no higher-order distribution
functions or other tools, such as higher-order statistics, are able to
provide additional information.
The required duration t of the BEP, at a given bit error
probability [34] of the bit exchange between Alice and Bob, is
determined by the following arguments: For the LL bit status of
Alice and Bob, which is not a secure situation, the channel voltage
and current satisfy
SU2c,LLT~Df Su,c,LL fð Þ
~4kTeff
RL
2
Df and SI2c,LLT
~Df Si,c,LL tð Þ~ 2kTeff
RL
Df ,
ð7Þ
while, in the case of the other non-secure situation namely the HH
bit status, the channel voltage and current satisfy
SU2c,HHT~Df Su,c,HH fð Þ
~4kTeff
RH
2
Df and SI2c,HHT
~Df Si,c,HH tð Þ
~
2kTeff
RH
Df :
ð8Þ
During key exchange in this classical way, Alice and Bob must
compare the predictions of Eqs. (7) and (8) with the actually
measured mean-square channel voltage and current to decide
whether the situation is secure (i.e., LH or HL prevails), while
realizing that these mean-square values are different in each of
these three situations (LL, LH or HL, and HH). If the situation is
secure, Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the
inverse of his/her bit, which implies that a secure key exchange
Figure 1. Outline of the core KLJN key exchange system. The communicator parties, Alice and Bob, randomly choose and connect either RL
or RH to the wire. The (effective) temperature Teff is publicly agreed and kept, and the (enhanced or standard) Johnson noises of the resistors
UL,A(t), UL,B(t), UH,A(t), and UH,B(t) are independent and Gaussian. The resulting channel voltage Uc(t) and current Ic(t) are also uncorrelated due
to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Parasitic elements leading to non-ideal features and defense circuitry against active (invasive) attacks and
against attacks utilizing non-ideal features are not shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g001
Figure 2. Mean-square voltage (and current) versus time during operation. There are three different levels (dotted lines) depending on the
actual bit values; the intermediate value indicates a secure bit exchange period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g002
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takes place. Alice and Bob must use sufficiently large statistics to
achieve low error probability. Fortunately, the bit error probability
decays exponentially with the duration t of the BEP [34].
Furthermore, a new ‘‘intelligent’’ KLJN protocol [31] can be used,
which employs additional circuit calculations by Alice and Bob to
reduce the BEP without increasing the error probability.
1.2.3 On active (invasive) attacks and attacks utilizing
non-idealities. It has been pointed out repeatedly
[2,26,28,29,32] that deviations from the earlier shown circuitry
and Johnson-like noise—including invasive attacks by Eve,
parasitic elements, delay effects, inaccuracies, non-Gaussianity of
the noise, etc—will cause a potential information leak toward Eve.
However it is fortunate that the KLJN system is very simple, which
implies that the number of such attacks is strongly limited. The
defense methods against the attacks are straight-forward and are
generally based on the comparison of instantaneous voltage and
current data at the two wire ends via an authenticated
communication between Alice and Bob, as indicated in Fig. 3.
These attacks [2,40,43,45] are not the subject of the present paper,
and we refer to our relevant rebuttals where they have been
analyzed [2,32,41,42,44] and where misconceptions and errors
have been pointed out and corrected. Our earlier survey paper [2]
reviewed various attacks on the KLJN scheme.
It is important to emphasize that Alice and Bob know Eve’s best
measurement information, because it is given by comparisons of
voltage and current at the two ends of the wire. If Eve uses the best
available protocol and the security of a certain bit is compromised,
this is known also by Alice and Bob who therefore can decide to
discard the bit in order to have a secure key. This is a new and
unique situation in cryptography, which raises a number of
research questions as mentioned in an earlier paper [32].
Finally, a secure type of privacy amplification [33]—XOR-ing
the key bit pairs and producing a new key with this output, which
results in half of the original length—is also feasible to enhance the
security because of the low bit error probability of KLJN key
exchange. The error probability decays exponentially with the
increasing duration t of the BEP [34]. At the experimental
demonstration [29] the error probability was 2|10{4.
1.2.4 Foundations of the information-theoretic security in
practical KLJN schemes. Of course, perfect security of any
physical key exchanger exists only under ideal (mathematical)
conditions. For example, quantum encryption theoretically can
offer perfect security only in the limit of a zero-photon-emission
rate [5] (i.e., zero bit exchange rate) and zero detector and channel
noise limits, which are unphysical and can never occur in a real
system. The KLJN scheme is no exception to this rule [2,26,32]: it
offers perfect security only at zero bandwidth or distance as a
consequence of transients, cable resistance, capacitance, etc.
However, just as for claims in favor of QKD, parameters of the
KLJN building elements and protocol can be chosen so that the
perfect security limit can be approached asymptotically. The
general situation in the non-ideal case is that a miniscule DC signal
component buried in a much larger Gaussian noise (of fixed
variance) must be detected by Eve from small statistics limited by
the BEP. This DC signal component is typically the mean value of
a finite-time mean-square operation or that of the output
component of a cross-correlation operation; further discussion
on this issue is given in an earlier paper [31] and in Sec. 2.8. Eve
must detect the sign of this small DC component in the large noise.
When the parameters approach the ideal situation, the ratio of the
DC signal amplitude and the root-mean-square (RMS) amplitude
of the noise converges towards zero as a power law decay—
typically with exponent 21 or 22 [2,29,42,44]—with regard to
the invested resources such as wire volume, current/voltage
resolution, BEP duration t, etc.
Figure 3. KLJN system minimally armed against invasive (active) attacks, including the man-in-the-middle-attack. Alice and Bob
measure the instantaneous channel voltage and current amplitudes and compare them via an authenticated public channel. In this way, they learn all
the information Eve can have. Additions to prevent hacking—such as line filters, blinding detectors, etc—are not shown. The notation is the same as
in Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g003
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Here we summarize the foundation of the mathematical
analyses below by explaining why and how Eve’s information is
limited compared to Alice and Bob’s information, even though we
have not imposed any limitation for Eve’s measurement accuracy
or her measurement speed anywhere in our analysis. This is a
point of frequent misunderstanding and the additional explanation
here was triggered by the referee report written by Dr. Bennett.
All our analyses and argumentations are based on a technically-
unlimited eavesdropper (Eve). Accordingly, Eve’s amplifiers and
analyzers have infinite amplitude resolution and infinite measure-
ment speed (infinite bandwidth), they are noise-free and absolutely
linear. Otherwise, parameters describing characteristic time/
frequency cut-off of Eve’s measurement apparatus and of the
amplitude resolution limit would enter into all of the equations
describing Eve’s information. Eve’s only measurement-technology
limitation is of fundamental physical nature: Eve can only very
poorly separate the signals originating from the two directions as
the result of the Rayleigh scattering at sizes much smaller than the
signal wavelength; see Sections 2.1.4 and 2.3.2 below. This
fundamental physical process is unavoidable, and Eve must live
with the fact that the laws of physics prohibit using an efficient
directional coupler. However, the same limitations concerning
Rayleigh scattering also apply to Alice and Bob.
Then, the obvious question emerges: Why does Eve have
significantly less information than Alice and Bob? One should note that
this question is relevant only for passive attacks in practice (that is,
non-ideal situations with finite distance, finite bandwidth, nonzero
cable resistance and capacitance) and active attacks for arbitrary
situations, because, for the ideal situation (with zero distance, finite
bandwidth, zero cable resistance and capacitance) the Second Law
guarantees perfect security. So, how can we summarize the main
arguments behind our security proofs against the various attacks
presented in this paper, and what is the fundamental mechanism
behind the unconditional security shown by our mathematical
security proofs?
Is it today’s technological limitations of Eve’s accuracy? No: it is
a fundamental limit: the statistical uncertainty principle interrelating the
finite measurement duration with statistical errors during noise
analysis.
Eve can measure with infinite speed, which means infinite
bandwidth, but she will not find anything beyond the noise bandwidth Df
set by the noise generators and line filters of Alice and Bob (except
negligible spurious, stochastic frequency components decaying in
an exponential or power-law fashion versus frequency beyond the
band limit). According to Shannon’s sampling theorem, the
maximum sampling frequency giving statistically independent data
is 2Df thus during the duration t of the BEP, Eve (just as Alice and
Bob) can extract only s~2Df t independent samples of the
channel noise even if Eve’s measurement apparatus can collect
samples with infinite sampling frequency. The quantity s is
determined by Alice and Bob because Df and t are determined by
them and chosen so that the error probability of exchanged bits is
miniscule, thus no error correction algorithm is needed. Yuen [5]
points out that error correction algorithms provides information to
Alice and Bob in QKD, but KLJN can avoid using such. In
practical applications one has s&100, which is an extraordinarily
small number for Eve to safely distinguish the minor differences,
10{4 or less [41], in the noise statistics she can extract using non-
idealities. For active attacks, Alice and Bob can easily enforce the
same small differences in the statistics—for example 14 bits, used
in the experimental demonstration, which is equivalent to a
difference of less than 10{4. It is virtually impossible to distinguish
such a small difference between stochastic signals with the
available number s of independent samples. As a result, the
mathematical analyses shown in the subsequent sections indicate
that Eve’s successful guessing probability will be close to 0.5,—i.e.,
the limit representing zero information—and the accepted
measure of security (statistical distance, see below) between Eve’s
extracted version of the key and a perfectly secure key is
exponentially small.
But what about Alice and Bob? Alice and Bob know essential
parameters that Eve does not have access to: they know their own
resistance value and the exact amplitude of their noise fed into the
line. Thus they do not need to utilize the non-ideality-based
miniscule differences seen by Eve or the even smaller differences
that Eve may generate by active (invasive) attack while staying
hidden; they only need to monitor the channel voltage/current
and identify which one of the three significantly different levels of
the mean-square noise takes place. At s&100, the achievable bit
exchange has extremely small error probability, such as 10{12, see
[34]. Further improvements are offered by the ‘‘intelligent’’ KLJN
method, where s can be significantly diminished by Alice and Bob
via reducing t when utilizing the knowledge of their own noise
time function, combined with linear network calculations [31]
allowed by the classical physical nature of the scheme.
1.2.5 Mathematical proof of the unconditional security of
the exchanged key. In order to mathematically analyze the
security of the shared key, one must compare the probability
distribution for successfully guessing each possible key sequence of
an N-bit-long key, encompassing 2N different sequences, with that
of the perfect key having uniform distribution. A statistical distance
measure, the variational distance D [46] between the distributions
representing the key guessed by Eve and the distribution
representing the ideal (uniform) key is a useful concept. It defined
by
D E,Ið Þ~ max
j~1,...,2N
P Ej
 
{P Ij
  
, ð9Þ
where E and I represent Eve’s extracted key and the perfect key,
respectively, and P(Ej) and P Ij
 
are the probabilities of correctly
guessing the jth version of Eve’s key and of the perfect key,
respectively. The key exchange has e-security, as discussed by
Hirota [6], if the statistical distance between the distributions
representing the key guessed by Eve and the ideal (uniform) keys is
less than e, i.e.,
D E,Ið Þƒe ð10Þ
for e§0.
The KLJN scheme provides identically and independently
distributed sequences of random variables as key bit values, so that
D E,Ið Þ~ max
j~1,...,2N
P Ej
 
{P Ij
  
~pN{0:5N , ð11Þ
where p is Eve’s probability of successfully guessing bits. In non-
ideal cases involving an information leak, and when the
parameters are sufficiently close to the ideal limit, p can be given as
p~0:5zq, ð12Þ
where 0vqvv0:5; here q~0 would mean a perfectly secure key.
The reason for this behavior is easy to see if one realizes that Eve’s
small DC signal component offsets the center (mean value) of the
probability density burying the large Gaussian noise. The first
derivative at the center of the Gaussian density function is zero,
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implying that its Taylor approximation, to first order, results in a
stable value for small changes around the center. In the idealized
case (i.e., zero DC signal) Eve’s estimation of the mean value of the
Gaussian noise would yield p~0:5 (recording a positive sign at
50% of the exchanged key bits and negative sign also at 50% of the
cases). In the non-ideal situation, the DC signal and the mean
value of noise+signal are positive or negative; hence the flat
amplitude distribution within this range makes Eve experience a
non-zero q (cf., Eq. 12) which is proportional to the DC signal [47].
As an example, we now consider the case of a non-zero wire
resistance [29,40–42] and assume that capacitive effects are
compensated [29] or can be neglected due to the actual
bandwidth. More examples will be shown in Chapter 2. For the
case of fixed distance and bandwidth, q is proportional to the
inverse of the square of wire diameter, i.e., with the inverse of the
wire’s volume V. In other words
q~qwV
{1, ð13Þ
where qw is a constant valid for a wire-resistance attack. Then, for
the case of Nqvv0:5, one obtains
D~ 0:5zqð ÞN{0:5N
~0:5N 1z2qð ÞN{1
h i
%2Nq0:5N
~2NqwV
{10:5N ,
ð14Þ
where the last approximation is valid for q?0. Equation (14)
indicates that D decays exponentially with increasing value of N
and inversely with wire volume V.
For the case of e-security with Dƒe, i.e., in the Nqvv0:5 limit,
the required q is given by
q(e,N)~
q
V (e,N)
ƒ e
2N
2N : ð15Þ
During the experimental demonstrations of the KJNL scheme,
referred to above [29], it was found that Eve’s q equaled 0.025 for
secure bit exchange during wire-resistance attacks with a wire
resistance being 2% of the loop resistance. For a practical
evaluation, let us suppose, that due to additional leaks (transients,
cable capacitance, etc.) the actual q is double of that, q~0:05. Due
to the 0vqvv0:5 assumption, in order to use the theory
described above, we apply the a privacy amplification described in
[33], which keeps the independently and identically distributed
nature of the key by XOR-ing pairs of bits in the original key to
have a new key with enhanced security and half of the length.
Then, repeating this process a second time to obtain the final key
with 25% of the original length, the resulting effective q of Eve is
q~5|10{5 [33] which allows key lengths N up to the order of
104 bits. Equation (11) can then be evaluated with this effective q
value. For a 1000-bit-long shared key, it results in
D E,Ið Þ1000~9:3|10{303 (i.e., an e-security with e1000%10{302);
for a 500-bit-long shared key it results in D E,Ið Þ500~1:5|10152
(i.e., an e-security with e500%2|10{152).
Finally, we observe that there are advanced protocols that can
enhance the security or limit the required resources in efficient
ways while the scaling of q versus the utilized resource (wire
volume, cf. Eq. 13) shown above in Eqs. (14) and (15) does not
change. Below we give a short list of advanced protocols and
associated basic security features proposed up to now:
(a) Ideal KLJN schemes with passive attacks:
N The Second Law of Thermodynamics and Kirchhoff ’s Loop
Law [2,26].
(b) Non-ideal KLJN schemes with passive or active (invasive)
attacks:
N Transient protocols involving random-walk from equal
resistances [31] and voltage ramping/timing [2,29].
N Selecting the noise bandwidth versus the value of wire
resistance and wire capacitance [2,29].
N General defenses that work in any situation including
hacking, encompassing comparison of instantaneous voltage
and current amplitudes and discarding any bits where they
differ or where they provide information to Eve (even it is
erroneous). Note, however, that specific protocols apply for
different hacking attacks.
N Privacy amplification (XOR-ing key bit pairs [33]).
N Enhanced KLJN protocols, for example the ‘‘intelligent’’
(iKLJN) and ‘‘keyed’’ (KKLJN) methods [31].
1.2.6 Optional security addition: cap imposed on q by
Alice and Bob. We briefly mention an additional security tool
provided by the classical physical nature of the KLJN system; see
its detailed description and security analysis elsewhere [48]. The
fact that Alice and Bob have a public authenticated communica-
tion channel for comparing their instantaneous current and
voltage data (together with the channel parameters known by
them) allows them to access the measurement information of Eve.
Thus they can discard those exchanged bits that give out too much
information to Eve. In another word, Alice and Bob can impose a
strict upper limit on q in Eqs. (12) and (15). This additional security
tool is useful when the available resources of Alice and Bob are
insufficient to diminish the q related to the exchanged raw bits and,
for some other reasons, they want to avoid privacy amplification to
reduce it. This ability of Alice and Bob is another indication that
they are in full control of the maximum of statistical information
Eve is able to access.
1.3 Summary of Bennett–Riedel’s arguments regarding
the KLJN scheme
BR have presented an extensive analysis [4] that is fundamen-
tally flawed but nevertheless very useful for the purpose of
elucidating differences between simplistic or irrelevant model
approaches and the physics upon which the KLJN scheme is
founded.
An outline of BR’s claims reads as follows: It is first stated that
the no-wave limit (i.e., quasi-static electrodynamics) is unphysical
for signal propagation. Based on this statement, they assert that
Eve can separate and measure the ‘‘orthogonal’’ wave components
propagating from Alice to Bob and vice versa. They also state that
the KLJN scheme is deterministic, which means that Eve has a full
description of the whole system, including Alice’s and Bob’s
history, if Eve’s measurements of the two wave components are
limited by nothing but the laws of physics. To support these
claims, BR expound that thermodynamics and noise are not
essential in the KLJN scheme and that thermodynamics would
eradicate determinism as a consequence of fluctuations. Further
corroboration of their view is obtained from the construction of a
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deterministic and thermodynamics-free key exchanger, which
looks similar to a KLJN scheme without resistor, and where two of
the four noise voltage generators are removed and the remaining
ones replaced by batteries with known and identical voltage.
Moreover, BR propose a passive correlation-measurement-based
attack and an active current-extraction attack against the KLJN
scheme.
After briefly describing BR’s claims, we critically analyze and
refute all of them in Chapter 2, and we also present the physics
appropriate for the KLJN scheme.
1.3.1 Bennett–Riedel’s claim concerning no information
transfer in a wire in the no-wave (quasi-static) limit. BR
write [4]: ‘‘We believe this no-wave limit is inappropriate and nonphysical
for analyzing communication protocols (even as a mathematical idealization)
because if propagating waves are excluded there is no way for information to get
from Alice’s side of the circuit to influence Bob’s side, or vice versa.’’
Based on this argument, they assert that Eve can separate and
measure the ‘‘orthogonal’’ wave components that propagate from
Alice to Bob and vice versa.
After surveying the relevant physics facts about waves,
directional couplers for signal separation and the no-wave limit
in Sec. 2.1, we refute the above argument in Sec. 2.2.
Furthermore, we show what physics has to say about signal
propagation in the no-wave (quasi-static) limit.
1.3.2 Bennett–Riedel’s claim that the KLJN system does
not offer security. BR [4] set up three equations for the KLJN
scheme, which invoke the deterministic nature of Maxwell’s
equations and neglect the stochastic nature of Johnson noise and
the secret/random choice of the resistors. With this premise, it is
not surprising that they concluded that KLJN does not offer any
security. Here we discuss only the first and third of BR’s
equations—since the second one is redundant—and their main
conclusion.
The conditional information H F Gjð Þ represents the remaining
uncertainty about the set of data F when the set of data G is
known. Now H F Gjð Þ~0 if G completely determines F, whereas
H F Gjð Þ~H Fð Þ for the case when G does not provide any
information about F. BR’s first equation is
H X ZAjð Þ~H X ZA,ZBjð Þ~H X Z,Yjð Þ, ð16Þ
where X is a variable that fully describes the physical quantities on
Alice’s side of Eve’s location during the BEP. These quantities
include waves traveling toward Alice and away from her and all of
her equipment, as well as noise and memory. The variable Y has
the same meaning with regard to Bob. Furthermore, ZA and ZB
are wave components propagating from Alice and Bob (as
observed by Eve), respectively, and Z= (ZA, ZB) represents both
wave components. We note that in BR’s paper [4] either Z is
incorrectly indexed or X and Y must be exchanged.
We first presume that Eq. (16) is valid, which assumes that ZA
and ZB can be measured separately. This means that the
uncertainty about Alice’s ‘‘full description’’ X does not change if
Eve expands her knowledge of wave ZA coming from Alice by the
knowledge of wave ZB coming from Bob, and the same remains
true even if knowledge of the total description of Bob’s data Y is
included.
It should be observed that the first equality in Eq. (16)
contradicts BR’s proposed passive correlation attack [4], which
requires knowledge of both ZA and ZB and thus implies that
H X ZAjð ÞwH X ZA,ZBjð Þ.
We now introduce the mutual information I X ;Yð Þ of X and Y,
which measures how much the knowledge of X or Y tells about the
other variable. As a consequence of Eq. (16), and with further
argumentation, BR deduce the following equation for the
conditional mutual information between X and Y, conditional on
Z:
I X ;Y Zjð Þ~H X Zjð Þ{H X Z,Yjð Þ~0: ð17Þ
This equation, if it is valid, would mean that after measuring the
two waves Z= (ZA, ZB), Eve’s information about X (i.e., Alice’s full
description) is not increased by learning Y (Bob’s full description).
Thus after measuring the two waves Z= (ZA, ZB), Bob’s
information about Alice would not be larger than Eve’s
information about her. The same argumentation would work also
in the opposite direction, so that the KLJN system would not offer
any security.
We will see below that BR’s equations are invalid even in the
wave limit; this is a result of multiple reflections as well as of Alice’s
and Bob’s secure reflection coefficients and noises (known only by
them) that always guarantee that they know more than Eve.
Most importantly, Eqs. (16) and (17) are entirely unfounded in
the no-wave limit because the propagating relaxations ZA and ZB
(which are not waves) cannot be measured separately; only their
sum can be determined.
1.3.3 Bennett–Riedel’s claim regarding a ‘‘thermodynamics-
free’’ key exchange scheme. One of the major claims of BR
[4] is that thermodynamics and noise are not essential for security
in the KLJN scheme. To prove this, they attempted to construct a
deterministic key exchange method with two voltage generators
and two switches, as illustrated in Fig. 4. This scheme is in fact
already known; it is called the ‘‘Orlando system’’ and was
conceived and patented by Davide Antilli in 2005 [49]. Despite its
origin, we refer to it as the ‘‘BR system’’ below.
In the idle mode between bit exchange periods, the switches are
in position I; thus the wire channel is grounded. At the beginning
of the BEP, Alice and Bob randomly choose between the switch
positions L or H representing the corresponding bit values, and at
the middle of the BEP they change their bit value. If the randomly
chosen sequences of bit values happen to be identical, then the
voltage on the wire will be zero for half of the BEP, and these
events are disregarded. If the choices by Alice and Bob are
complementary, then the voltage is U0 for the whole BEP.
BR make three statements about the system in Fig. 4, which will
be important later: They assert that (i ) ‘‘The wires and voltage sources
Figure 4. Outline of the (Antilli–) Bennett–Riedel system. The
two ends of the wire channel are connected to a three-stage switch
with positions I (idle between two bit exchanges), L (low bit value) and
H (high bit value). The two DC voltage generators have the voltage U0 ,
and Uc(t) and Ic(t) are the voltage and current time-functions in the
wire. Note that this figure is an improved version of BR’s system
because they mention the idle situation (necessarily grounded wire)
only in the text but do not show it in their figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g004
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are taken to be ideal, with zero thermal noise’’ and, as a corollary, that (ii )
‘‘Thermodynamics and noise do not play a role.’’ Furthermore, they claim
(iii ) that the BR system is secure in the ‘‘no-wave’’ limit accomplished in a
special way: that Eve waits with her measurements until transients
have decayed.
We will see below that statements (i ) to (iii ) lead to an
unphysical situation, namely that Eve must wait for infinite time
before she may start listening. Furthermore, one should note that
(iii ) is an illegal assumption in unconditionally secure communi-
cations, because then Eve can only be limited by the laws of
physics. Thus statement (iii ), in itself, would imply only conditional
security.
In Secs. 2.1 and 2.2 below we show why BR’s scheme is
unphysical, and we also crack it fully in a variety of ways while we
demonstrate that the KLJN scheme stays unbroken as a
consequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and of noise.
1.3.4 Bennett–Riedel’s wave-transient-based attack
before the steady state is reached. BR write [4]: Thus, while
the steady state mean square noise voltage in the original KLJN protocol does
not allow Eve to distinguish between the LH and HL settings of Alice’s and
Bob’s resistors she can distinguish them using (a) transient waves created by the
switching action before the steady state is established.
For example Bob’s resistor affects the phase and amplitude correlations
between a right-traveling wave at time t and its left-traveling echo at time t+D,
where D is the transit time from Eve to Bob and back, with the echo vanishing
only if the resistor is perfectly impedance matched to his end of the line.
Here it should be noted that BR have not put forward any
concrete protocol with a quantitative and testable evaluation
scheme. This is unfortunate because, by establishing such a
protocol, one can see that, in the no-wave limit, such transients
would represent minor information for Eve about Alice’s and
Bob’s status. Even if propagating signal components (not waves)
could be measured, the limited information about the noise within
a small fraction of its correlation time (and the unknown additive
noise and reflection at the other end of the wire) would make the
information available to Eve very small. Moreover, even this
minuscule information would converge towards zero upon a
decrease of the noise bandwidth and/or a reduction of the wire
length. The statistical distance between the key guessed by Eve
and that of the perfectly secure key (of the same length) will vanish
in a fashion similar to the one described by Eqs. (14) and (15).
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 below discuss an efficient transient protocol
and quantitative analysis.
1.3.5 Bennett–Riedel’s passive time-correlation attack in
the no-wave limit. BR write [4]: Thus, while the steady state mean
square noise voltage in the original KLJN protocol does not allow Eve to
distinguish between the LH and HL settings of Alice’s and Bob’s resistors, she
can distinguish them using (b) time correlations in the steady-state distribution
of traveling waves resulting from the fluctuations that give rise to Johnson-
Nyquist noise. For example Bob’s resistor affects the phase and amplitude
correlations between a right-traveling wave at time t and its left-traveling echo
at time t+D, where D is the transit time from Eve to Bob and back, with the
echo vanishing only if the resistor is perfectly impedance matched to his end of
the line.
We will analyze this problem in Secs. 2.6 and 2.7 and give a
security proof showing that the statistical distance between the key
guessed by Eve and the perfectly secure key will vanish in an
exponential fashion versus the length of the key.
1.3.6 Current extraction/injection based active (invasive)
attack. BR write [4]: …she (Eve) could still learn the key by an active
steady-state attack in which she would place a very high-resistance shunt
between her node and ground, and monitor the direction of current flow into it.
Of course Alice and Bob could try to detect this weak leakage current also, and
abort the protocol if they found it. The result would be an unstable arms race,
won by whichever side had the more sensitive ammeter, not the sort of robustness
reasonably expected of a practical cryptosystem.
We observe that this attack is valid only against the BR system
because, in the KLJN scheme, the direction of the current flowing
into the shunt resistor does not provide any information since its
origin is a Gaussian noise process with zero mean and exhibiting
perfect symmetry around zero. What BR might want to say for the
KLJN scheme is that, by using the shunt resistor in the middle, the
change of the RMS current in the wire will be greater in the
direction of the lower resistance than in the directions of the higher
resistance.
A very small difference in current, such as the one referred to
above, results in an extremely poor statistics for Eve, and therefore
one of the present authors (LK) has proposed a more efficient
attack of the mentioned type in the original paper describing the
KLJN scheme [26]: this attack entails a separate noise current
generator instead of a shunt resistance as well as an evaluation of
the cross-correlations between the injected current and the
channel currents at the two sides of the injection. These cross-
correlations determine which end of the wire has the low and
which one has the high resistance. An attack of this type was
disregarded as being inefficient already in the foundation paper for
KLJN [26], because Eve would need a very long time to create
sufficient statistics to reach a reasonable decision, whereas she only
has the short duration of the BEP before the process ends. In Sec.
2.8, we analyze this attack mathematically and give a security
proof against it.
Results and Discussions
The flow of analysis and argumentation in this chapter is as
follows: First, in Sec. 2.1, we survey well-know facts about the
physics related to the no-wave (quasi-static) limit of electrodynam-
ics as well as facts about information transfer in that limit. Then, in
Sec. 2.2, we refute BR’s claim that there is no information transfer
in the quasi-static (no-wave) limit. In Sec. 2.3 we then analyze
BR’s equations (Eqs. 16 and 17 above) indicating zero security and
show that they are invalid for the KLJN scheme not only in the no-
wave limit but also in the wave limit, whereas they are indeed valid
for BR’s thermodynamics-free system. In Sec. 2.4 we demonstrate
that BR’s thermodynamic-free key exchanger is unphysical
because transients will oscillate for infinite time in the wire.
Subsequently, in Sec. 2.5, we analyze the real, physical BR system
and present ten different ways to fully crack it. We also show there
that none of these ways of cracking work against the KLJN
scheme, which proves that thermodynamics is essential for the
security of KLJN. In Sec. 2.6 we argue that BR are incorrect when
they write that the wave-transient attack would crack the KLJN
system, and we also find that the statistical distance between the
key guessed by Eve and the ideal key exponentially converges zero
versus the length of the key. In Secs. 2.7 and 2.8, we demonstrate
why BR’s passive-correlation attack does not work in the KLJN
system and why BR’s current-extraction attack fails to change the
exponential convergence of the statistical distance to zero. Finally,
Sec. 2.9 contains some general remarks about protection against
hacking.
2.1 Physics facts: Information, propagation, and wave
couplers in the quasi-static limit
In Secs. 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 we clarify what is meant by a wave in
physics: what are the conditions for the existence of a wave, and
what is quasi-static electrodynamics [50] represented by circuit
symbols? We also discuss whether electronic circuits are able to
transfer signals and information in the quasi-static (no-wave) limit,
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and we treat the nature of delayed signal propagation in the no-
wave limit as well as the inefficiency to separate propagation
directions with directional couplers [51]. Here we emphasize it
again: the issue is fundamental limitation due to the laws of
classical physics.
2.1.1 The mathematical definition of a wave in
physics. In physics, a wave is defined as a propagating
amplitude disturbance U(x,t) that is the solution of the wave
equation
c2
L2U(x,t)
Lx2
~
L2U(x,t)
Lt2
, ð18Þ
where c is the phase velocity, i.e., the propagation velocity when no
dispersion is present. The dynamics of waves is governed by the
oscillation of energy between two types, such as the electrical and
magnetic field energies. If only one of these types of energy takes
part in the propagation—or if the propagation is not based on the
bouncing of energy between these two fields—then the propagat-
ing field disturbance is not a wave but merely a near-field
oscillation with retardation effects.
We now consider a wire with finite size L. The wave equation in
Eq. (18) has solutions only for frequencies
f§fm~
c
2L
: ð19Þ
In other words, propagating field disturbances with frequency
components below the minimum wave frequency fm do not satisfy
the wave equation, and hence they are not waves. We concur with
BR that propagation and corresponding time delays (i.e.,
retardation) are essential notions, but the propagating entities
are not waves but field relaxations, and the consequences of this
will be outlined below. Thus BR’s statements about propagating
‘‘orthogonal’’ wave components that can be separated in the two
directions is simply unphysical and leads to incorrect equations
and conclusions. Furthermore, when the KLJN scheme operates
in the ‘‘no-wave limit’’, this means that the condition
fvvfm~
c
2L
ð20Þ
applies [2,26], and BR are correct in using the term ‘‘quasi-static’’
to describe this situation. However, in the limit of quasi-static
electrodynamics [50] it is incorrect to classify the propagating
disturbances as waves; these disturbances are neither the solution
of the wave equation nor do their electrical and magnetic fields
have wave energy bouncing back and forth between them during
propagation.
2.1.2 The quasi-static limit of electrodynamics, and
electrical circuitry symbols with lumped elements. Quasi-
static electrodynamics [50] and Eq. (20) constitute the bases for
the operation and associated circuit drawings of any electrical
circuit with lumped elements. The physical implication is that—
along a line in a circuit drawing and the corresponding wire in
the realized circuit, and at a given moment—the instantaneous
current and the voltage amplitudes are virtually homogeneous,
and retardation effects (including waves) can be neglected. In
the absence of these implications, everyday electrical engineering
design of circuits with lumped elements would be invalid and
impossible.
2.1.3 Signal propagation in the no-wave (quasi-static)
limit. After the comments above it is obvious that BR’s
assertion, that without waves in the wire there is no information
transfer, is not only unphysical but also in blatant contradiction
with everyday experience. No landline phones, no computers or
other electrical circuits with lumped elements would be able to
function and process information if BR’s claim were true! In
conclusion, the quasi-static (no-wave) limit [50] is a physically valid
working condition for the KLJN system, and it is not unphysical as
BR claim.
2.1.4 Further implications of the quasi-static (no-wave)
limit: Directional couplers, etc. We now consider wave-based
directional couplers for extracting and separating signal compo-
nents in two directions. These couplers simply do not work in the
quasi-static limit, and even in the wave limit the cancellation of the
irrelevant signal component is strongly frequency dependent
because it is determined by the successful destructive interference
of wave components in the coupler [51]. Couplers with good
directivity are of the size l0=4, where l0~c=f0 and f0 is the
frequency for optimal operation. For longer wavelengths (i.e.,
smaller frequencies), the system is subject to Rayleigh scattering
and, accordingly, the separation of intensities decays with a power
function scaling according to f 4.
There are also non-wave-based directional couplers, which are
able to separate signals coming from two directions in the wire.
These couplers work with lumped elements, such as transformers
or active devices, and can be efficient in a wide frequency range.
Their working principle is to cancel the signal of the irrelevant
direction by subtracting from the channel voltage another voltage
that is induced by the channel current. However, all of these
couplers fail with the KLJN key exchanger because, for a proper
operation to reveal Alice’s voltage spectrum, the designer must
know the exact value of her resistor. If instead Bob’s resistor value
is used, then the resulting signal voltage will be different and
signal’s spectrum will match Bob’s noise spectrum instead. This
fact is again a consequence of the Second Law of Thermody-
namics, which guarantees that the cross-correlation of the channel
voltage and channel current is zero, which leads to statistically
independent channel voltage and current as a result of their
Gaussian nature. Similarly, measuring the channel voltage Uc(t)
and current Ic(t) and creating U

L(t)~Uc(t)+Ic(t)RL and
UH (t)~Uc(t)+Ic(t)RH would not offer information as a conse-
quence of the independence and the Gaussianity of Uc(t) and
Ic(t). According to basic noise calculus, the spectrum of U

L(t) and
UH (t) would be 4kTeff RL and 4kTeff RH , respectively, indepen-
dently of the sign for the second terms in these sums. In
conclusion, non-wave-based directional couplers do not provide
useful information for Eve.
2.2 Refutation of Bennett–Riedel’s claim about no
information transfer in the no-wave limit
As already shown in Sec. 2.1.3, there is indeed information
transfer in the no-wave limit, and this fact is supported by common
experience; cf. Eqs. (18) to (20). Therefore, the quasi-static limit is
physical in an information processing system.
2.3 Invalidity of Bennett–Riedel’s equations, and the
correct equations
Below, we show that BR’s equations are invalid for the KLJN
scheme, in the wave limit as well as in the no-wave (quasi-static)
limit.
2.3.1 The wave limit and the Pao-Lo Liu key exchange
system. It is important to note that the default operation of
BR’s system (cf., Fig. 4) is within the wave limit, which is a
consequence of the abrupt switching of the voltage (cf., Sec. 2.4)
and the generated high-frequency products. Moreover, in the BR
Security Analysis of the KLJN Key Exchange
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e81810
system, no noise unknown by Eve is fed by Alice and Bob into the
system. Thus Eqs. (16) and (17) are indeed valid for the BR system
(but not for KLJN). As a consequence, the BR system does not
offer any security for Alice and Bob, as further discussed in Sec.
2.5.
The wave limit represents an illegal operational condition for
the KLJN scheme, and therefore it is unimportant. However there
is a software-based protocol working in the wave limit, known as
the Pao-Lo Liu key exchange system [52–54], which was inspired
by KLJN but does not utilize the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics. In the Liu protocol, random number samples of infinitesimally
low noises (in the ideal situation) at Alice’s and Bob’s sites are sent
and reflected with random sign of the reflection coefficient. Alice’s
reflection coefficient, and the noise intensity added by her, is
chosen so that, in the steady-state mode of ideal conditions, BR’s
proposed correlation attack [4] between the incoming and
outgoing waves does not yield any information for Eve. The
relevant relation for the Liu protocol, in the ideal situation, is
H X ZAjð Þ~H X Zjð Þ~H(X )w0 ð21Þ
instead of the zero-security situation, H X ZAjð Þ~H X Zjð Þ~0,
implied by BR’s considerations and Eq. (17) [4]. Furthermore and
surprisingly, Liu’s system seems to satisfy
I X ;Y Zjð Þ~H X Zjð Þ{H X Z,Yjð Þw0 ð22Þ
in steady-state and at the ideal limit. Liu’s system has other
weaknesses, though, stemming from the wave limit, viz., the
distinct possibility to observe ZA and ZB; these flaws lead to
problems with transients [53] and vulnerability to non-ideal filters
[54]. Neither is Liu’s system protected by the Second Law of
Thermodynamics or other laws of physics.
Finally, returning to the KLJN scheme but lingering in the wave
limit, we have the following comments: If only the waves coming
from Alice’s direction and denoted ZA are known, this particular
situation provides less information about Alice’s total description
than the situation when the waves ZB coming from the direction of
Bob are known as well. This is so because ZA alone offers limited
information about the reflection coefficient, and the resistance
determining it, at Alice’s side. On the other hand, in accordance
with BR’s passive correlation attack discussed in Sec. 1.2.5 (and
also in Sec. 2.7 for the no-wave limit, where it does not work), the
cross-correlation of ZA and ZB (requiring the wave limit) provides
more information about the reflection coefficient at Alice than ZA
does, and thus H X ZAjð ÞwH X Zjð Þ. We note, in passing, that
BR’s attack and its justification contradict their own equation,
given in Eq. (16), which claims that adding ZB to the knowledge of
ZA does not help Eve. The duration of the BEP is limited in the
KLJN protocol, and thus the relation H X ZAjð ÞwH X Zjð Þw0
applies in Eq. (21).
It should be observed that Liu’s system [52–54], described
above, is slightly different from the KLJN system in the wave limit
(which is illegal for KLJN) because, in the Liu protocol, the added
and reflected noises are combined at the two ends in such a way
that, in the ideal case, the cross-correlation does not yield any
information from Eve. Thus Liu’s system implies that, in general,
the correct relation for the wave limit is H X ZAjð Þ§H X Zjð Þw0.
2.3.2 Bennett–Riedel’s equations for the KLJN scheme in
the no-wave (quasi-static) limit. BR’s relations in Eqs. (16)
and (17) do not exist for the KLJN system in the quasi-static limit
because ZA and ZB are not observable separately [51]. Directional
couplers that are able to separate such waves would produce
outputs corresponding to
Z
0
A~ZAz(1{k)ZB ð23Þ
and
Z
0
B~ZBz(1{k)ZA ð24Þ
with k!1=f 2. The largest separation would be at the high cut-off
frequency Bkljn of the noise bandwidth. As already pointed out in
Sec. 2.1.4, this will lead to unconditional e-security e!B4kljn
 	
, i.e.,
results of the same nature as in Eqs. (14) and (15). The resources
invested by Alice and Bob are the duration t of the BEP and the
length of the key e!2{Nt{4
 
.
Finally, we set up the correct relations replacing Eqs. (16) and
(17): The conditional information terms for the KLJN scheme
satisfy
H Xð ÞwH X Uc,Icjð ÞwH X Uc,Ic,ZA


 
wwH X Uc,Ic,ZA,Y


 w0, ð25Þ
where Uc(x,t),Ic(x,t) are current and voltage amplitudes along the
wire in the steady state, where the dependence on x is miniscule
and approaches zero for Bkljn?0, and ZA(x,t) is the initial
transient disturbance (not wave) running from Alice toward Bob
until Bob’s end is reached and Bob’s unknown noise is mixed into
it. The last conditional information term expresses the fact that
Bob, by knowing his own total description, is able to make an
almost perfect guess of Alice’s description X [31]. However this
term is still larger than zero, because errors remain even in this
case [31,34], implying that a small uncertainty is left. Corre-
spondingly, instead of Eq. (17), the correct relations for the
conditional mutual information satisfy
I X ;Y Uc,Ic,Z

A


 ~H X Uc,Ic,ZA

 {
H X Uc,Ic,Z

A,Y


 &0 ð26Þ
2.4 Proof that Bennett–Riedel’s key exchanger is
unphysical
It is easy to see that BR’s key exchanger is unphysical in its
present form (cf., Fig. 4). To this end, let us consider how long Eve
has to ‘‘graciously wait’’ for the termination of the switching
transients before she can measure. This time, in fact, is infinite
because the transient will bounce back from the two endpoints of
the wire, with the same sign from the open end and with altered
sign from the endpoint terminated by the battery.
The observations above serve as a clear proof that, in the
absence thermodynamics and the loss/energy dissipation it
implies, even BR’s key exchanger cannot function, and this holds
true also if we permit violations of the basic rules of security—viz.,
that Eve is allowed to measure whenever she can and wants—and
instead force Eve to wait until the transients decay, which takes
infinitely long time.
In conclusion, BR’s scheme is unphysical, and one must realize
that there are losses in ‘‘real’’ physical systems and that the related
energy dissipation is controlled by thermodynamics.
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2.5 Ten ways to crack Bennett–Riedel’s key exchanger by
passive attacks
Below, we show ten ways to crack BR’s thermodynamics-free
system with 100% success rate, and we furthermore point out that
the same cracking methods do not work with the KLJN scheme,
which is a consequence of thermodynamics and noise.
2.5.1 Six universal energy/current-flow-analysis
attacks. To circumvent the problem of waves, Alice and Bob
use proper voltage envelopes to prevent wave-modes (high-
frequency components belonging to the wave limit). In practice,
the wave modes should be kept negligible. Another alternative is
that Alice and Bob use filters. One should note that convergence
requires some loss, which is unavoidable for any real physical
system.
Six universal energy/current-flow-analysis attacks are based on
the fact that any wire has a geometrical capacitance, and to charge
the wire one needs a current flow, energy flow and power flow.
Measurement of voltage and current, and determination their
product, gives the power flow and its direction as shown in Fig. 5.
This power flow is the quasi-static analogue of the Poynting vector
in electromagnetics.
The power flow vector is given by
~P(t)~Uc~Ic(t), ð27Þ
and the energy flow vector is its integral over the BEP according to
~E~
ðt
0
~P(t)dt: ð28Þ
Eve’s situation is fully characterized by the direction of the current
vector ~Ic(t), the mean power flow vector S~P(t)T, and the energy
flow vector ~E. The magnitudes of the S~P(x,t)T, ~E(x) and S~I(x,t)T
vectors with regard to location also fully inform Eve and
compromise security. The further away from the connected
voltage source these location-dependent quantities are evaluated,
the less are their values, and they are zero at the open end. The
directions of these vectors during the charge-up period are toward
the open end.
In conclusion, the direction and the location-dependence of the
three measurable quantities offer six ways to fully crack the key in
the BR system.
2.5.2 Three transient-damping resistor attacks. To
make the system physical and stop the transient after one return,
Alice and Bob may use damping resistors to match the wave
resistance of the wire, as shown in Fig. 6. These resistors will cause
a continuous noise current flowing into the geometrical capac-
itance of the wire. There are then three more ways to utilize
thermodynamics to crack this system during the steady state.
The noise current is correlated with the time derivative of the
channel voltage and can be written
~Y~S
dUc(t)
dt
~Ic(t)T: ð29Þ
Both the sign of the cross-correlation vector ~Y and its value with
regard to location fully inform Eve about the situation; their
absolute values are zero at the free end of the wire and maximum
at the closed end.
A third way to crack the key is given by the location-dependence
of the RMS channel current, which is zero at the open end and
maximum at the closed end.
Figure 5. Universal energy-flow-analysis attack against BR’s
scheme in the no-wave limit. The no-wave limit is provided by the
specific time-function of the voltage U0(t). The capacitive current
density jc(t) toward the ground is spatially homogeneous along the
wire, which leads to a maximum channel current amplitude~Ic(t) power
flow vector and energy flow vector at the closed end, and zero at the
open end. The direction of these vectors during the charge-up period is
pointing toward the open end.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g005
Figure 6. Transient-damping-resistor version of BR’s scheme,
and capacitive noise current attack. The direction and the location-
dependent value of the cross-correlation vector ~Y for the time-
derivative of the channel voltage and the current vector provide two
ways to crack the key, while the location-dependence of the RMS
channel current offers a third way.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g006
Figure 7. BR’s scheme with finite wire resistance and Johnson
noise attack. With a wire resistance of Rw and in the steady-state
mode, Eve will measure a zero-power density spectrum Su at the closed
end of the wire and Su~4kTRw at the open end.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081810.g007
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2.5.3 Wire-resistance Johnson-noise attack. Any wire will
have non-zero resistance, and thus it produces Johnson noise. Eve
can simply measure the voltage noise between the wire and the
ground at the two ends of the wire, as indicated in Fig. 7.
The free end of the wire will have a voltage noise spectrum
given by
Su~4kTRw, ð30Þ
while the connected end shows zero noise. Consequently Eve can
fully crack the system. One may note that this attack can be
avoided if the connected end of the wire has a large additive noise
to conceal the noise given by Eq. (30), but then the former attacks
utilizing the current, power flow and energy flow vectors will still
crack the system even in the steady state.
2.5.4 The above attacks are inefficient against the KLJN
system as a result of thermodynamics. It is easy to
understand how thermodynamics and noise, fed by the two
communicating parties, protect the KLJN scheme against the
above attacks. The resistors used by Alice and Bob make the
system thermodynamic and produce Johnson noise. The noise
voltages are much larger than the parasitic Johnson noise of the
wire, because the wire resistance must be small (maximum 1 to 2%
of RLzRH ). Similarly the noise bandwidth is chosen so that the
capacitive currents are negligible compared to the channel
current.
The implication of the considerations above is that, when the
above described attacks are used against the KLJN scheme, Eve’s
measurement will be a small DC signal buried in a large noise.
This leads to relations similar to those shown for the wire
resistance voltage drop in Eqs. (12) to (15), and the information
theoretic security will be almost perfect. In the case of analogous
attacks against the BR case, on the other hand, there is no other
type of noise to bury Eve’s signal. The rectified noise voltages and
currents, and the cross-correlation results, are all uni-polar noises
for which either the polarity of this quantity provides the result or,
when its size matters, the size compared to zero. For example, the
Johnson noise of the wire should be evaluated only at its two ends
and should be zero at one end and non-zero at the other. Neither
statistics nor averaging is needed to crack the BR system with these
attacks; the result is virtually instantaneous and within the
correlation time of the noise.
2.6 On transient attacks against the KLJN scheme
This attack is different from other attacks in the literature and in
this paper in the sense that, in the no-wave (quasi-static) limit
where KLJN operates, no concrete realization has ever been
proposed with a measurement and evaluation protocol. Therefore,
at the moment, this attack is only hypothetical but is brought up
here for the sake of completeness and debate.
Researchers working with the KLJN scheme have realized from
the very beginning that transients pose vulnerabilities, and various
schemes have been proposed to reduce the potential information
leak; they include ramping up/down of the noise, starting from
zero noise amplitude (and velocity), and adiabatic random walking
of Alice’s and Bob’s resistance [31]. The efficiency of any attack is
strongly limited; firstly, this is due to the quasi-static condition that
is manifested by the noise voltage envelope and filters and,
secondly, it is due to the unknown resistances and noises at the two
ends of the wire. As soon as the front of the propagation (not wave)
of the band-limited noise reaches the other end, new information
about the particular noise is strongly reduced. Even in the case of a
no-transient protocol, Eve has effectively only a very small sample
of a noise whose duration is much shorter than its correlation time.
First we describe the so far best-known transient protocol, which
is based on random-walk resistances [31]. Alice and Bob
arbitrarily choose RL or RH as their RA and RB, and they use
continuously variable resistors—such as potentiometers, MOS-
FETs, etc—to execute the key exchange. If noise generators are
employed to enhance the noise temperature, then their band-
limited white noise spectra also need to be variable in a
synchronized fashion so that the noise temperature stays constant
at the publicly agreed value Teff . Furthermore, suppose that the
noise bandwidth in the KLJN scheme is secured by line filters at
Alice’s and Bob’s ends. At the beginning of the KLJN clock period,
both Alice and Bob start with
RA(0)~RB(0)~
RLzRH
2
, ð31Þ
and they stay at this value until the noises equilibrate in the wire.
Thus no informative transients can be observed just after
connecting the resistors to the line, because the bit values have
not yet been realized. Then Alice and Bob execute independent,
adiabatically slow continuum-time random walks with their
resistor values (in a fashion synchronized with the spectral
parameter of their noise generators). The random walks are
performed so slowly that—from a thermodynamic point of view—
the system is changing in the adiabatic limit; thus there is almost
thermal equilibrium in the wire during the whole random-walk
process.
There is a publicly pre-agreed time tr to execute these
independent random walks. If Alice and Bob reach their randomly
preselected values RA and RB within this time period, then they
stop the random walk and stay at this value. After the time period
tr they restart the measurements in the regular fashion. This
procedure virtually removes the transient effects and the informa-
tion leak they may cause.
If, by the end of the time tr, the random walk of Alice or Bob (or
both) does not reach the randomly preselected resistance value,
then he/she (or both) submit a cancellation signal via an
authenticated channel, and the bit exchange process is immedi-
ately aborted; then a new independent KLJN-clock-period starts in
the way described above.
Concerning security, the production of spurious frequency
products is proportional to the RMS speed vrms of the random
walk and, if a concrete attack is implemented, it is reasonable to
assume that it satisfies
q~qtrvrms, ð32Þ
where qtr is a constant relevant for the transient attack against this
scheme (cf. Eqs. 12 and 13). The above assumption leads to
unconditional e-security e!vrmsð Þ with results of the same nature
as those given in Eqs. (12) and (15) and with statistical distance
D~ 0:5zqð ÞN{0:5N%2Nq0:5N~2Nqtrnrms0:5N : ð33Þ
If q is not small enough, it can further be reduced by the privacy
amplification [33] because of the high fidelity of the KLJN
scheme.
Here the resource used to approach the perfect security is the
duration t of the BEP, because it is inversely proportional to vrms
when the random walk time is dominating. In other words, at fixed
key length the ‘‘price’’ of increasing the security is a reduction of
the speed of key exchange, and e!0:5Nt{1N can again be
arbitrarily small.
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2.7 Why Bennett–Riedel’s passive correlation attack does
not work against KLJN
Directional couplers have limited bandwidth, work in the wave
limit and—given that their directivity is good—have a size l0=4 (cf.
Sec. 2.1.4). For much longer wavelengths—i.e., smaller frequen-
cies, as in the KLJN scheme—the system displays Rayleigh
scattering and accordingly (cf. Eqs. 23 and 24) the passive
correlation attack results in a correlation coefficient with power
function scaling according to f 4. These conditions lead to
unconditional e-security e!f 40:5N
 
with results that again are
of the same nature as those in Eqs. (12) and (15) and with statistical
distance
D~ 0:5zqð ÞN{0:5N%2Nq0:5N~2NqcrB4kljn0:5N , ð34Þ
where qcr is a constant defined as in Eq. (13). This value can
further be enhanced by privacy amplification [33], if needed.
Here the resource used to approach perfect security is the
duration t, t!1=Bkljn
 
of the BEP, because it is inversely
proportional to the highest frequency in the noise-bandwidth. In
other words, at fixed key length the cost of increasing the security
is a reduction of the speed of key exchange, and e!0:5Nt{4N can
again be arbitrarily small.
2.8 Why the current extraction/injection active attack
does not work against KLJN
BR [4] propose an active (invasive) attack wherein Eve connects
a grounded resistor to the line in order to extract some current and
also monitors the current direction in the wire. BR’s verbatim
statement was reproduced in Sec. 1.2.6 above.
We fully agree with the above assessment when it refers to the
BR system. However this attack is inefficient against the KLJN
scheme, and this fact was pointed out already in the original paper
describing the KLJN scheme [26]. In fact, this latter paper
proposes a technically more efficient attack of the same nature:
that Eve injects a stochastic current at the middle and monitors the
cross-correlation of this current with the channel currents in the
two directions; the correlation coefficient will be greater in the
direction of the smaller resistance. This attack was later pointed
out also by Reiner Plaga and Horace Yuen in private commu-
nications. Alice and Bob monitor the channel currents at the two
ends and compare their instantaneous amplitudes via an
authenticated public channel. If the currents differ, the bit
exchange event is terminated and that bit is discarded.
In this section we show a mathematical proof that the uncertainly
principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it
impossible for Eve to crack the key and the unconditional security
remains even against this type of attack. The usual argument to
justify the attacks referred to above is that Eve may use miniscule
current amplitudes, which are below the detection limit of the
comparisons by Alice and Bob. This argument does not work,
however, because Alice and Bob can design their current
resolution so that Eve, by implementing this attack, cannot extract
enough information. Mathematically, the channel current at
Alice’s side of Eve is
IcA(t)~Ic(t){cIE(t), ð35Þ
and at Bob’s side of Eve it is
IcB(t)~Ic(t)z(1{c)IE(t), ð36Þ
where IE(t) is Eve’s injected current and (1{c)=c~RA=RB. The
cross-correlations with Eve’s current during the BEP are
rA ~S Ic(t){cIE(t)½ IE(t)Tt
~SIc(t)IE(t)Tt{cSI
2
E(t)Tt
~UcEt(t){cSI2E(t)T{cUEEt(t),:
ð37Þ
rB ~S Ic(t)z 1{cð ÞIE(t)½ IE(t)Tt
~SIc(t)IE(t)Ttz 1{cð ÞSI2E(t)Tt
~UcEt(t)z 1{cð ÞSI2E(t)Tz 1{cð ÞUEEt(t)
ð38Þ
where STt stands for finite-time (t) average, U for noise
components, and ST for the exact average (requiring infinite
time). The dominant terms at the right-hand side of Eqs. (37) and
(38) are the noise terms of the cross-correlations between Eve’s
current and the channel current, with mean-square amplitudes
scaling as t{1. The RMS amplitude Eve’s correlation signal (after
finite-time averaging) is negligible compared to that of the channel
current, and its DC component
rDC~sSI
2
E(t)T, ð39Þ
where sv1. The last noise terms at the right-hand side of Eqs. (37)
and (38) are negligible compared to the first noise terms. The
detection problem is again the same as the one encountered at the
wire-resistance-attack: a small DC component (of the second term)
in a large noise (dominated by the first term). Thus, as inferred
from Eqs. (12) and (13), q will again satisfy
q~qcisSI2E(t)T, ð40Þ
where qci is a constant relevant for this current injection/
extraction attack at fixed t (note that qci is inversely proportional
to t). Again one reaches unconditional e-security e!0:5Nsð Þ, with
results of the same nature as those in Eqs. (12) to (15) and with
statistical distance
D~ 0:5zqð ÞN{0:5N%2Nq0:5N~2NqcisSI2E tð ÞT0:5N : ð41Þ
As a practical example, let us consider 9 bits accuracy of
current/voltage comparison defense by Alice and Bob, which
means
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
SI2E(t)T
q
=
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
SI2c (t)T
p
v2|10{3 implying that Eve’s rela-
tive DC component will have the same maximum. For a similar
value of asymmetry during the experimental demonstration [29],
the resulting q was 0.025. In that case, a two-step XOR-type
privacy amplification [33], described in Section 1.1.4 will achieve
qv5|10{5, which allows key lengths N up to the order of 104
bits. Similarly to the situation in Section 1.1.4, for a 1000-bit-long
shared key, it gives D E,Ið Þ1000~9:3|10{303 (i.e., an e-security
with e1000%10{302); for a 500-bit-long shared key it results in
D E,Ið Þ500~1:5|10{152, i.e., an e-security level with
e500%2|10{152.
2.9 Remarks about potential hacking attacks
Mathematical models of physical systems and their building
elements are always approximate, and security proofs can only be
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given for these model systems. Particularly dangerous are the
elements that are directly exposed to Eve. Thus a commercial
secure key exchanger must be carefully designed with considering
all the foreseeable hacking attacks.
For example, a real KLJN scheme must be armed with extra
circuitry and protocol steps against Makarov-style blinding attacks
[11], circulator-based attacks [32], and other unexplored possibil-
ities such as out-of-frequency-range probing attacks, etc.
Methods and Conclusions
We showed that thermodynamics, noise, and the Second Law of
Thermodynamics—i.e., the impossibility to construct a perpetual
motion machine of the second kind—are essential for the security
of the classical physical key exchanger in the KLJN scheme.
Furthermore we supplied mathematical security proofs for each
attack proposed by Bennett and Riedel [4]. Our results indicate
that the security of the KLJN system has not been successfully
challenged by them.
We also showed that the Bennett–Riedel scheme is unphysical
and we cracked it with 100% success by passive attacks, in ten
different ways. It was found that the same cracking methods do not
function for the KLJN scheme. Some other claims by BR we
subjected to critical analysis as well; for example, we proved that
their equations for describing zero security do not apply for the
KLJN scheme.
It is important to emphasize that all our analyses have assumed
a technically-unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measure-
ments. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the
uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors
makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the
accuracy or speed of her measurements.
Acknowledgments
LK is grateful to Horace Yuen, Vadim Makarov, Renato Renner and
Vincent Poor for helpful discussions, consultations and critical remarks
about relevant security measures, and to Robert Mingesz, Henning
Dekant, John Norton and Gabor Schmera for related discussions.
Furthermore, we are indebted to Charles Bennett and Jess Riedel for
their work, cited in Ref. [4], which has given us an opportunity to sharpen
our arguments in favor of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN)
scheme.
Author Contributions
Analyzed the data: LK DA CGG. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis
tools: LK DA CGG. Wrote the paper: LK DA CGG.
References
1. Liang Y, Poor HV, Shamai S (2008) Information theoretic security. Foundations
Trends Commun. Inform. Theory 5:355–580. DOI: 10.1561/0100000036.
2. Mingesz R, Kish LB, Gingl Z, Granqvist CG, Wen H, et al. (2013)
Unconditional security by the laws of classical physics. Metrology &
Measurement Systems XX:3–16. DOI: 10.2478/mms-2013-0001. http://
www.degruyter.com/view/j/mms.2013.20.issue-1/mms-2013-0001/mms-
2013-0001.xml
3. Bennett CH, Brassard G (1984) Proc. Int. Conf. on Computers, Signals, and
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India. pp. 175–179.
4. Bennett CH, Riedel CJ (2013) On the security of key distribution based on
Johnson-Nyquist noise. http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435
5. Yuen HP (2012) On the foundations of quantum key distribution—Reply to
Renner and beyond. arXiv:1210.2804.
6. Hirota O (2012) Incompleteness and limit of quantum key distribution theory.
arXiv:1208.2106v2.
7. Renner R (2012) Reply to recent scepticism about the foundations of quantum
cryptography. arXiv:1209.2423v.1.
8. Yuen HP (2012) Security significance of the trace distance criterion in quantum
key distribution. arXiv:1109.2675v3.
9. Yuen HP (2009) Key generation: Foundation and a new quantum approach.
IEEE J Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics 15, 1630.
10. Salih H, Li ZH, Al-Amri M, Zubairy MS (2013) Protocol for direct
counterfactual quantum communication. Phys Rev Lett 110:170502.
11. Merali Z (29 August 2009) Hackers blind quantum cryptographers. Nature
News, DOI:10.1038/news.2010.436.
12. Gerhardt I, Liu Q, Lamas-Linares A, Skaar J, Kurtsiefer C, et al. (2011) Full-
field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography
system. Nature Commun. 2; article number 349. DOI: 10.1038/ncomms1348.
13. Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, et al. (2010) Hacking
commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination.
Nature Photonics 4:686–689. DOI: 10.1038/NPHOTON.2010.214.
14. Gerhardt I, Liu Q, Lamas-Linares A, Skaar J, Scarani V, et al. (2011)
Experimentally faking the violation of Bell’s inequalities. Phys. Rev. Lett.
107:170404. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.170404.
15. Makarov V, Skaar J (2008) Faked states attack using detector efficiency
mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols. Quantum
Inform Comp 8:622–635.
16. Wiechers C, Lydersen L, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, et al. (2011) After-gate
attack on a quantum cryptosystem. New J. Phys. 13:013043. DOI: 10.1088/
1367-2630/13/1/013043.
17. Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, et al. (2010) Thermal
blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography. Opt. Express 18:27938–
27954. DOI: 10.1364/OE.18.027938.
18. Jain N, Wittmann C, Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Elser D, et al. (2011) Device
calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett.
107:110501. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.110501.
19. Lydersen L, Skaar J, Makarov V (2011) Tailored bright illumination attack on
distributed-phase-reference protocols. J. Mod. Opt. 58:680–685. DOI: 10.1080/
09500340.2011.565889.
20. Lydersen L, Akhlaghi MK, Majedi AH, Skaar J, Makarov V (2011) Controlling
a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright
illumination. New J. Phys. 13:113042. DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/
113042.
21. Lydersen L, Makarov V, Skaar J (2011) Comment on ‘‘Resilience of gated
avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum
cryptography’’. Appl. Phys. Lett. 99:196101. DOI: 10.1063/1.3658806.
22. Sauge S, Lydersen L, Anisimov A, Skaar J, Makarov V (2011) Controlling an
actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light. Opt. Express
19:23590–23600.
23. Lydersen L, Jain N, Wittmann C, Maroy O, Skaar J, et al. (2011) Superlinear
threshold detectors in quantum cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 84:032320. DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevA.84.032320.
24. Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, et al. (2010) Avoiding
the blinding attack in QKD: Reply (Comment). Nature Photonics 4:801–801.
DOI: 10.1038/nphoton.2010.278.
25. Makarov V (2009) Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by
bright light. New J. Phys. 11:065003. DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/11/6/065003.
26. Kish LB (2006) Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson(-like)
noise and Kirchhoff’s law. Phys. Lett. A 352:178–182.
27. Cho A (2005) Simple noise may stymie spies without quantum weirdness.
Science 309:2148; http://www.ece.tamu.edu/,noise/news_files/science_
secure.pdf.
28. Kish LB (2006) Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the
Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based
security. Fluct. Noise Lett. 6:L57–L63. http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512177.
29. Mingesz R, Gingl Z, Kish LB (2008) Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based
secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand
kilometers, via model-line, Phys Lett A 372:978–984.
30. Palmer DJ (2007) Noise encryption keeps spooks out of the loop. New Scientist,
issue 2605 p.32; http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19426055.300-noise-
keeps-spooks-out-of-the-loop.html.
31. Kish LB (2013) Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-
noise scheme. Metrology & Measurement Systems XX:191–204. open access:
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mms.2013.20.issue-2/mms-2013-0017/
mms-2013-0017.xml?format = INT
32. Kish LB, Horvath T (2009) Notes on recent approaches concerning the
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise-based secure key exchange. Phys. Lett. A 373:901–
904.
33. Horvath T, Kish LB, Scheuer J (2011) Effective privacy amplification for secure
classical communications. Europhys. Lett. 94:28002. http://arxiv.org/abs/
1101.4264.
34. Saez Y, Kish LB, Mingesz R, Gingl Z, Granqvist CG (2013) Current and voltage
based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-
noise secure key exchange. http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.2179. http://vixra.org/
abs/1308.0113.
35. Kish LB, Kwan C (2013) Physical uncloneable function hardware keys utilizing
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange and noise-based logic. http://
vixra.org/abs/1305.0068; http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.3248
Security Analysis of the KLJN Key Exchange
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 14 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e81810
36. Kish LB, Saidi O (2008) Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms and
hardware. Fluct Noise Lett 8:L95–L98.
37. Gonzalez E, Kish LB, Balog R, Enjeti P (2013) Information theoretically secure,
enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over the smart grid with switched
filters. http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0094; http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.3262.
38. Kish LB, Mingesz R (2006) Totally secure classical networks with multipoint
telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise.
Fluct. Noise Lett. 6:C9–C21.
39. Kish LB, Peper F (2012) Information networks secured by the laws of physics.
IEICE Trans. Commun. E95-B:1501–1507.
40. Scheuer J, Yariv A (2006) A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson
(like) noise – How secure? Phys. Lett. A 359:737–740.
41. Kish LB, Scheuer J (2010) Noise in the wire: The real impact of wire resistance
for the Johnson(-like) noise based secure communicator. Phys. Lett. A 374:2140–
2142.
42. Kish LB (2006) Response to Scheuer-Yariv: ‘‘A classical key-distribution system
based on Johnson (like) noise – How secure?’’. Phys. Lett. A 359:741–744.
43. Hao F (2006) Kish’s key exchange scheme is insecure. IEE Proc. Inform. Soc.
153:141–142.
44. Kish LB (2006) Response to Feng Hao’s paper ‘‘Kish’s key exchange scheme is
insecure’’. Fluct. Noise Lett. 6:C37–C41.
45. Liu PL (2009) A new look at the classical key exchange system based on
amplified Johnson noise. Phys. Lett. A 373:901–904.
46. Arora S, Barak B (2009) Computational Complexity. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
47. Kish LB (2006) Thermal noise driven computing. Appl. Phys. Lett. 89:144104.
48. Kish LB, Granqvist CG (2013) On the security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-
noise (KLJN) communicator. http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.4112.
49. Antilli D (2005) System and method for the propagation of deterministic and
non-deterministic values by means of electrical conductors. Patent publication
numbe r EP1952573 (A2 ) . h t t p : //www.goog l e . c om/pa t en t s /
EP1952573A2?cl = en
50. Pauli W (2000) Electrodynamics. Dover Publications, New York.
51. Matthaei GL, Young L, Jones EMT (1964) Microwave Filters, Impedance-
Matching Networks, and Coupling Structures. McGraw-Hill, New York.
52. Liu PL (2009) A key agreement protocol using band-limited random signals and
feedback. IEEE J Lightwave Technol 27:5230–5234.
53. Liu PL (2009) Security risk during the transient in a key exchange protocol using
random signals and feedback. Phys. Lett. A 373:3207–3211.
54. Kish LL, Zhang B, Kish LB (2010) Cracking the Liu key exchange protocol in its
most secure state with Lorentzian spectra. Fluct. Noise Lett. 9:37–45.
Security Analysis of the KLJN Key Exchange
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 15 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e81810
